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ABSTRACT 
We posit that nonprofits that provide a greater supply of unprofitable services (beneficent 
nonprofits) face lenient regulatory enforcement for mispricing in price-regulated markets. 
Consequently, beneficent nonprofits exploit such regulatory leniency and exhibit higher 
mispricing. Drawing on organizational legitimacy theory, we argue that both regulators and 
beneficent nonprofits seek to protect their legitimacy with stakeholders, including those who 
demand access to unprofitable services. Using data from hospitals, we examine mispricing via 
“upcoding”, which involves misclassifying ailment severity. Archival analysis indicates less 
stringent regulatory enforcement of upcoding for beneficent nonprofit hospitals, defined as 
hospitals that provide higher charity care and medical education. After observing regulator 
leniency, beneficent hospitals demonstrate higher upcoding. Our results suggest that lenient 
enforcement assists beneficent nonprofits to obtain higher revenues in price-regulated markets. 
 
Keywords: Regulator leniency; nonprofit organizations; beneficence; mispricing; upcoding 
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“There are a lot of inefficiencies in the health care system, if you look at it from a purely 
economic standpoint. If we were just running an economy and not a society, a lot of things would 
be closed down or be a lot smaller than they are. But there are good social reasons to keep a 
hospital open in the community, even though it may not be efficient.”  
Kerry Weems, CMS administrator, 2009 
“My job requires me to balance two important policy goals—saving taxpayer money and 
protecting Medicare’s beneficiaries” through “preserving access and quality of care”.  
Marilyn Tavenner, CMS administrator, 2014  
INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofit organizations serve an important role in society by providing essential services 
that are unattractive for private enterprise or undersupplied by the government (Weisbrod, 1977, 
1988). For example, nonprofit hospitals provide medical education and access to care for the 
uninsured (Clement, Smith, and Wheeler, 1994; Morrisey, Wedig, and Hassan, 1996; Weisbrod, 
1988). Funding for medical education has faced steep reductions in recent years, which places 
pressures on teaching hospitals.
1 The over 54 million uninsured individuals in the U.S. (in 2013) 
mostly use hospital emergency rooms for basic and advanced medical care, which strains hospital 
resources. Fulfilling medical teaching needs and serving the uninsured are therefore the two most 
urgent beneficent services provided by nonprofit hospitals (AAMC, 2013; Frank and Salkever, 
1991; Gallup, 2014; Krishnan, Joshi, and Krishnan, 2004). Institutional as well as stakeholder 
theorists argue that the provision of beneficent services is essential for nonprofit hospitals’ 
legitimacy with public as well as private stakeholders such as local, state, and federal agencies, 
                                                            
1 The primary funding for graduate medical education (GME) is provided by the Department of Health and Human 
Services, through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 placed limits 
on GME funding. In 2010 the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform recommended further 
reductions in GME payments.   
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donors, and community groups that enable hospitals to survive and thrive in their social 
environment (Freeman, 1984; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995).
2 To enable the 
provision of such beneficent services, nonprofit hospitals obtain support in the form of tax 
exemptions, donations, and subsidies (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Such support, however, is by 
and large neither reliable nor sufficient to compensate hospitals for the costs of providing these 
services (Chen, Bazzoli, and Hsieh, 2009).  
Health care regulatory agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
3 overtly state that access to 
health care is one of their core strategic goals.
4 They also acknowledge the insufficient 
compensation for hospitals that provide charity care and medical education (e.g., CMS, 2005a; 
CMS, 2013). These agencies face pressures from stakeholders to curtail health care costs and 
crack down on medical fraud, but at the same time they also face pressures to ensure the supply 
of charity care and medical education.
5 The fixed-price reimbursement used by most federal and 
private insurance programs limits the opportunities for regulatory agencies to allow for additional 
compensation for beneficent services using mechanisms such as differential pricing (Dranove, 
1988).  
This poses a quandary for both hospitals that provide unprofitable services (beneficent 
hospitals) and regulatory agencies. For beneficent hospitals the provision of unprofitable services 
                                                            
2  Over recent decades nonprofit hospitals that fail to provide unprofitable services have been subject to public 
scrutiny by diverse stakeholders including governments, regulatory agencies, media, donors, and the public at large 
(e.g., Carreyrou and Martinez, 2008; Frank and Salkever, 1991; Kearns, 1994; Pear, 1990, 2006). 
3 CMS, formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), is the largest operating division 
within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services that is accountable for how it spends Medicare dollars 
and is responsible for safeguarding against improper payments (GAO, 2000). 
4 Specifically, HHS (2014b) lists that one of its primary goals is to “ensure access to quality, culturally competent 
care, including long-term services and supports, for vulnerable populations.” Further it states: “HHS agencies are 
working to address health disparities experienced by minority and underserved populations who have historically had 
limited access to care and poor health outcomes.”  
5 For example, the Center for Health Care Strategies (CHCS), a nonprofit health policy agency, states “as states 
redesign their health care safety net to meet new legislative requirements, they should consider the strategic and 
financial support that charity care programs will need to remain effective.” (CHCS, 2010).  
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is essential to their mission and influences stakeholders’ perceptions of legitimacy, but providing 
these services exposes them to financial hardships. For regulatory agencies, ensuring the supply 
of these unprofitable services without compromising on their role as enforcers of regulatory 
standards is important for their own continued legitimacy (Hiatt and Park, 2012). We explore 
whether this results in a dynamic process whereby regulators signal enforcement leniency 
towards beneficent nonprofit hospitals, which react with increased mispricing to cross-subsidize 
the provision of unprofitable services.  
To investigate regulatory leniency, we focus on regulators’ enforcement of laws intended to 
prevent fraudulent mispricing. In particular, we focus on upcoding, a mispricing technique that 
involves classifying a patient into a diagnosis-related group (DRG) that yields higher 
reimbursement from Medicare and other insurers.
6 Upcoding is an acknowledged problem in the 
U.S. health care industry and has been estimated to cost in the range of $23.2 billion in 1996 to 
$44 billion in 2012 (GAO, 2000, 2013; HHS, 2013; OIG, 2001a). Regulatory agencies such as 
the CMS seek to prevent upcoding (CMS, 2013).
7 However, these agencies are also aware that 
upcoding may be motivated by funding deficits to cover the cost of unprofitable services and may 
support such hospitals “if there is a good social reason to be served” (Iglehart, 2009).  
We measure beneficence as the extent of provision of charity care and resident training. We 
investigate upcoding in three DRG families identified as being prone to upcoding in a study by 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1998).
8 The high upcoding risk stems from 
                                                            
6 DRGs identify patients with similar conditions and processes of care and requiring similar resources for treatment. 
Each DRG has a weight based on its relative costliness to the average for all DRGs. These weights are used for 
reimbursement by various programs including Medicare and other public and private insurance programs (Folland, 
Goodman, and Stano, 1997). 
7 If detected, upcoding can lead to lawsuits against the hospital (Blount and Gold, 1999). For instance, in 2000, HCA 
was sanctioned for unlawful billing practices and sentenced to pay a fine of more than $840 million (Crennen, 2013). 
8 A DRG “family” is a group of DRGs that are associated with the same underlying body system. For example, 
Angina and Cardiac Arrhythmia belong to the same family, i.e., circulatory system disorders. Throughout the paper 
we use the terms “DRG family” and “DRG group” interchangeably.    
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the judgment involved in assigning patients to a particular DRG and the high financial benefit 
from upcoding. For our empirical tests, we collect hospital and patient-level data from all 
nonprofit general acute-care hospitals in California for the time period 1996 to 2007. To examine 
regulator-hospital dynamics, we divide our analysis into two parts. First, we investigate 
regulatory enforcement actions for the period 1996–1998, when no reliable public information 
about regulatory enforcement for upcoding was available to hospitals (Silverman and Skinner, 
2004); therefore there was no credible justification for hospitals to differ in their upcoding 
patterns. This period thus provides a good setting to examine the association between regulatory 
preferences and enforcement. Second, we examine the upcoding behavior of hospitals for the 
period 1999–2007, after they had the opportunity to observe regulatory preferences. 
The first portion of the analyses uses a sample of 557 hospital-year observations and 
identifies hospitals convicted under the False Claims Act as of 1999 for upcoding during the time 
period 1996–1998. While beneficent hospitals did not have lower rates of upcoding instances 
compared to their less beneficent peers, they had fewer upcoding convictions, suggesting that 
regulatory agencies use judgment in their enforcement activities and are lax about enforcement 
for beneficent hospitals. The analysis controls for two hospital-specific financial motives to 
upcode, i.e., meeting a zero-profit earnings target (Leone and Van Horn, 2005), and incentive 
compensation tied to financial performance (Eldenburg et al., 2011). We find that nonprofit 
hospitals that meet the zero-earnings benchmark are more likely to be convicted for upcoding. 
This finding suggests that regulatory agencies employ stricter enforcement criteria if upcoding is 
driven by purely financial motives, whereas enforcement is attenuated if upcoding is driven by 
beneficent motives. 
The second portion of the analyses uses a sample of 1,447 hospital-year observations for 
the period 1999–2007 and investigates whether there is a positive association between the degree  
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of beneficence and upcoding. We find that a higher proportion of indigent patients is associated 
with more upcoding amongst a greater number of DRGs, as is a larger number of residents per 
hospital bed. These results hold after controlling for hospital size, patient characteristics, severity 
of illness, hospital performance, and market competition, among other variables. To obtain 
additional evidence that the positive association between degree of beneficence and upcoding is 
in response to the regulatory leniency provided to beneficent hospitals, we re-estimate our 
analysis for the time period 1996–1998, when hospitals could not observe regulatory preferences. 
We find that the significant relationship between upcoding and the degree of beneficence either 
disappears or gets weaker. These findings suggest that beneficent nonprofit hospitals engage in 
more upcoding than their less beneficent peers after they have had the opportunity to observe 
regulatory preferences conveyed in the enforcement process, but not before. 
The strategic management literature emphasizes the need for studies that enhance our 
understanding of the complex social dynamics surrounding regulation. As Hiatt and Park (2012, 
923) note, “studies have almost exclusively focused on policy making by legislators and have 
neglected policy implementation by regulatory agencies—a serious omission, in that regulatory 
agencies have more contact with businesses than legislators do via day-to-day interpretation and 
execution of laws.” Our study contributes by empirically demonstrating the complex dynamics 
between regulators and regulated organizations (Bonardi, Hillman, and Keim, 2005) that can arise 
in industries where both parties seek to protect their legitimacy among the same set of 
stakeholders. While the dominant assumption in archival research in many different fields is that 
firms in the same industry are exposed to similar levels of enforcement, i.e., regulation is 
exogenous and uniformly applied, our study articulates the dynamics of the relationship between 
regulators and organizations. Our results indicate that although regulators are supposed to be the 
“enforcers”, stakeholders expect such enforcement to be neither passive nor uniformly applied. In  
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contrast to prior work, which generally argues and finds that regulatory judgment can hinder 
regulatory effectiveness and social welfare (e.g., Bonardi et al., 2005; Bonardi, 2004; Hillman 
and Keim, 1995; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Jia, 2013), we show that in some instances, 
regulatory judgment may not reduce welfare. Our study offers a departure from some of the 
literature that adopts the premise that inconsistency in the application of regulation is driven by 
regulatory capture (Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971) or rent seeking (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), 
whereby the regulated firm gains at the expense of the customer. In our setting, although the 
beneficent hospital gains from upcoding, a portion of the financial gain is likely diverted towards 
social welfare. Our study also contributes to the strategic management literature that explores 
nonprofits’ strategic reactions to shifts or declines in funding (Bielefeld, 1992, 1994; McMurtry, 
Netting, and Kettner, 1991; Nielsen, 1986; Provan, 1987). Upcoding is likely an alternative 
strategy for beneficent hospitals to cover costs of unprofitable services in the presence of fixed-
price reimbursement. These results should be of interest to policy makers, regulatory agencies, 
and organizations operating in health care as well as other industries.  
The following section outlines the theoretical framework of regulator-hospital dynamics 
and presents the hypotheses. We then describe the institutional background, and the data and 
methods. Following this, the results are discussed and a conclusion is offered.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Regulator leniency 
Regulatory agencies are set up as watchdogs of public interest (Laffont and Tirole, 1991). 
As a result, the objective function of regulators is typically modelled as maximization of the 
weighted average of consumer surplus and producer surplus (Armstrong and Sappington, 2007; 
Naughton, 1989). At the same time, there is acknowledgement in research and practice that 
regulators do not always act to protect public interest, but could pursue personal agendas such as  
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resource maximization or career advancement (e.g., Weingast, 1984; Weingast and Moran, 1983). 
Regulators could, for example, be lax in enforcement of large corporations as a result of political 
pressures or side payments (e.g., Demski and Sappington, 1987; Klein and Sweeney, 1999; 
Naughton, 1989; Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971). Overall, economic theory does not assume that 
regulators are passive machines that merely implement regulatory rules; it also recognizes that 
regulators exercise judgment and may act in their own interest, the consumers’ interest, or in the 
interest of the industries that they are supposed to regulate. 
Sociologists articulate the legitimacy concerns of regulators (e.g., Hiatt and Park, 2012). 
Regulators derive legitimacy if their activities are construed by stakeholders as desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions 
(Suchman, 1995). Stakeholders with the strongest impact on regulators’ resources, autonomy, and 
future success include local, state, and federal governments, who have power over regulators’ 
budgets, nominate directors, and oversee regulatory activities. Other stakeholders include voters, 
professional associations, nonprofit organizations, and public interest groups, who can influence 
governments via lobbying activities (Hiatt and Park, 2012; Suchman, 1995). Actions of 
regulatory agencies that are perceived as desirable can confer legitimacy on those agencies, 
shaping the perceptions of stakeholders and preserving and promoting regulators’ access to 
resources and power (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Delmas and Toffel, 2004; King, Felin, and 
Whetten, 2010). However, the assessment of the appropriateness of regulators’ actions is far from 
straightforward, because most regulations are not “bright-line” rules, but instead contain broad 
language to allow for some flexibility. This leads to the necessity of using judgment in the 
interpretation of a regulatory violation and allows regulatory agencies to balance the goal of 
effective regulatory enforcement against protecting legitimacy with important stakeholders.  
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Health care is an industry where such balance between regulatory enforcement effectiveness 
and protection of legitimacy with stakeholders is particularly complex. The U.S. health care 
sector is subject to extensive attention from public as well as private stakeholders (Brown, 1992). 
Regulators such as HHS and CMS, which have oversight responsibilities for the health care 
industry as a whole, are especially subject to tough and often conflicting demands for expanded 
access to high-quality care at lower costs. For instance, access to care for uninsured and the 
provision of medical education are primary concerns of state and federal governments who 
oversee health care regulatory agencies and make budgets allocations (e.g., Congress, 1981; 
Cooper, 2007; Eckholm, 2006; Kane and Wubbenhorst, 2000; Sanders, 2013). Communities that 
lack access to high-quality care or have a high proportion of indigent residents exert pressure on 
local politicians as well as health care regulators (Schuck, 1986). Consequently, regulators such 
as HHS and CMS make public statements that expanded access to high-quality care is their core 
strategic goal (e.g., CMS, 2013; HHS, 2001, 2014a). Regulators have some funds at their 
discretion to compensate hospitals for increased access via supplemental resources through 
federal or local grants and subsidies. For instance, in 2009, the HHS had a budget of $268 million 
to fund the cost of treating uninsured patients. In 2004, CMS announced a budget allocation of $1 
billion over a four-year period to help hospitals to cover the costs of treating uninsured patients. 
Teaching hospitals are eligible for a higher reimbursement rate to help defray the costs of medical 
education.  
However, regulatory efforts are by and large insufficient to ensure the provision of care to 
uninsured patients or cover all the costs of medical education (Bernstein, 2012; Chen et al., 2009; 
Lewin, 1997). Teaching hospitals, for instance, are required to have state-of-the-art technology, 
research facilities, and specialized services, which add to the already substantial cost of 
maintaining a residency program (Cooper, 2007). In a similar manner, for many nonprofit  
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hospitals, state and federal subsidies to cover the cost of providing care for the uninsured 
typically only cover part of a hospital’s cost (Hadley et al., 2008). In cognizance of this, 
regulators attempt to provide additional support by exercising the latitude provided to them in the 
interpretation of regulation. For instance, before the advent of fixed-price regulation, regulators 
implicitly approved beneficent hospitals’ cross-subsidization, whereby the prices charged to some 
patient groups and some ailments were systematically higher than costs (Dranove, 1988; Gruber, 
1994). The widespread prevalence of cross-subsidization was tacitly approved by regulators as 
compensation for the distortions and inequities in health care coverage (Covaleski, Dirsmith, and 
Michelman, 1993; Harris, 1979; Sapolsky, 1986). After the introduction of the fixed-price 
regulation, cross-subsidization was no longer possible. In their attempt to cover uncompensated 
costs, hospitals explored other strategies such as upcoding as another form of cross-subsidization, 
despite the fact that it is considered fraudulent billing. The CMS and HHS use a number of 
control and monitoring tools to reduce the risk of upcoding and can prosecute hospitals for 
upcoding under the False Claims Act (CMS, 2013).  
Passive implementation implies that health care regulators will investigate hospitals that are 
most likely to upcode and uniformly prosecute and convict hospitals if they detect upcoding. 
Such behavior could be easily justified because of the demand by society at large to eliminate 
improper payments in taxpayer-funded public insurance programs (Congress, 2010; GAO, 2000). 
Upcoding and other types of improper payments can be substantial, e.g., they range from $23.2 
billion in 1996 to $44 billion in 2012 (GAO, 2000, 2013; HHS, 2013; OIG, 2001a) and impose 
constraints on already strained public resources. Moreover, they also raise the ire of taxpayers; 
therefore avoiding these improper payments is a core concern of state and federal governments. 
However, imposing an inflexible, “one size fits all” stance and convicting all hospitals for 
upcoding can incur the displeasure of another set of stakeholders, who expect a “break” for  
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hospitals that take care of the community’s indigent and provide resident training. Regulators 
therefore are likely to take into consideration the benefits provided by the hospital to the 
community. To the extent that such assessment reveals a track record of providing unprofitable 
services, regulators are less likely to convict such a hospital. Indeed, the CMS interprets its 
enforcement mandate against improper payments in the context of the hospitals’ environment of 
constrained resources and acknowledges that it has to “balance two important policy goals—
saving taxpayer money and protecting Medicare’s beneficiaries” through “preserving access and 
quality of care” (Stewart and Weaver, 2014). The CMS considers health care not just an 
economic issue, but also a social issue and acknowledges that it will support an inefficient 
hospital if there are “good social reasons to keep a hospital open” (Iglehart, 2009).  
We therefore argue that the complicit behavior of regulators, manifested as lower likelihood 
of conviction for upcoding, is driven by attempts to improve their legitimacy with stakeholders 
who desire unprofitable services, leading to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Beneficent nonprofit hospitals are less likely to be convicted under the False 
Claims Act than other nonprofit hospitals.   
Beneficent nonprofit hospitals’ upcoding behavior 
For nonprofit hospitals, health care access and medical education are crucial to their 
objective function (Weisbrod, 1977, 1988) and are supported in part by subsidies and donations.
9 
Nonprofit hospitals face considerable institutional pressures from political, professional, and 
occupational constituencies to provide these services, regardless of the extent of financial 
                                                            
9 Hospitals are partially reimbursed by Medicaid or state/county indigent programs for a proportion of their indigent 
patients. The primary source of financing for teaching hospitals is Medicare, which provides a higher reimbursement 
rate to teaching hospitals. The rate premium depends on the number of residents trained per inpatient bed (resident-
to-bed ratio) leading to a per-case premium of 5.5 percent for approximately a 10 percent increase in the resident-to-
bed ratio. Such premium also makes it more beneficial for teaching hospitals to engage in upcoding in general. In 
addition, nonprofits are exempted from property taxes and from the corporate income tax (Frank and Salkever, 
1994).  
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support. However, these institutional pressures are not uniformly imposed (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Krishnan et al., 2004; Ruef and Scott, 1998; Scott, 2001). For instance, nonprofit 
hospitals typically have boards with representatives from the local community who place 
demands for the provision of unprofitable services. Private donations as well as state and federal 
funding are often conditional on providing unprofitable services (e.g., Okten and Weisbrod, 
2000). These institutional forces set the framework for establishing and monitoring the 
nonprofit’s stock and flow of legitimacy capital (Krishnan et al., 2004). Curtailing unprofitable 
services and the concomitant adverse publicity can hurt the nonprofit’s legitimacy (Carreyrou and 
Martinez, 2008; Krishnan et al., 2004; Pear, 1990, 2006).  
However, organizations are not passive recipients of whatever legitimacy rewards they are 
granted by stakeholders. Managers can monitor, control, and influence the legitimation process. 
Stakeholder management theory depicts legitimacy as an operational resource that organizations 
extract from their environments and employ in pursuit of their goals (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; 
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). If provision of unprofitable services helps manage a nonprofit 
organization’s legitimacy with stakeholders that are critical to its success, then the nonprofit will 
ensure that these services are provided (Freeman, 1984; Suchman, 1995) and attempt to manage 
the financial losses suffered in the process.  
There are many mechanisms by which organizations can conform to stakeholders’ 
expectations; some are symbolic or ritualistic rather than tangible or real (Pfeffer, 1981; 
Suchman, 1995). For example, nonprofit hospitals could advertise that they provide unprofitable 
services but not have the resources allocated to provide these services. Indeed, several nonprofit 
hospitals have been criticized for the insufficient provision of unprofitable services over recent 
decades (e.g., Carreyrou and Martinez, 2008; Frank and Salkever, 1991; Kearns, 1994; Pear, 
1990, 2006). For beneficent hospitals, where the provision of unprofitable services is tangible  
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rather than symbolic, the concern is to bridge the resource gap. Though upcoding allows 
beneficent hospitals to recoup some of these resources, it could lead not only to loss of legitimacy 
and reputation but also financial costs such as penalties and the potential loss of nonprofit tax-
exempt status. Therefore, upcoding strategies have to be applied cautiously, after assessment of 
the benefits versus costs. That is, hospital managers need to determine how best to comply with 
regulations such that their legitimacy remains intact without seriously undermining their financial 
resources (Edelman, 1992; Edelman and Suchman, 1997; Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger, 1999).  
All hospitals can benefit from upcoding, as it increases revenue, and consequently, profit. 
Organizations test and collectively construct the form and boundaries of compliance in a way that 
meets regulatory demands yet preserves managerial interests (Edelman, 1992). If beneficent 
hospitals recognize that they are subject to less stringent regulatory enforcement as predicted in 
H1, they can upcode more extensively than their less beneficent peers without fear of reduced 
legitimacy. We argue that, to meet their resource needs, beneficent hospitals upcode more than 
their non-beneficent peers. This leads to the following hypothesis:    
Hypothesis 2: Beneficent nonprofit hospitals upcode to a greater extent than other 
nonprofit hospitals. 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND, DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD   
Institutional background: Upcoding by U.S. hospitals and its enforcement  
Medicare patients account for about 50 percent of a typical U.S. hospital’s revenues (Torio 
and Andrews, 2013). Medicare pays a fixed price per patient depending on the patient’s  
15 
diagnosis-related group (DRG) based on the treatment and corresponding cost. DRG-based 
reimbursements are also used by most major insurers (Reinhardt, 2006).
10 
The DRG is assigned as follows. When a patient is admitted, the attending physician makes 
a report of the patient’s condition and the recommended procedures and treatment. This report is 
then forwarded to the hospital’s medical coders, who assign the patient to a specific DRG at the 
time of discharge.
11 Although this assignment is based on the patient’s medical record, there is 
latitude in assigning a patient to one DRG versus the other. For example, suppose a patient is 
admitted with respiratory infections and does not exhibit any complicating factors. This patient 
should be assigned to DRG 80, for which the hospital will receive $4,377.50 reimbursement.
12 By 
upcoding the patient to DRG 79, i.e., respiratory infections and inflammations with 
complications, the hospital will obtain a reimbursement of $8,188.50, which is a revenue gain of 
$3,811 without any corresponding cost. To upcode from DRG 80 to DRG 79, the hospital has to 
add a complicating or comorbidity (cc) factor such as anemia, asthma, diabetes, depression, 
hypertension, or ulcer, among others, to the patient’s medical record.
13  
Hospital management can use several mechanisms to facilitate upcoding (Dafny, 2005). For 
instance, Silverman and Skinner (2004) provide anecdotal evidence that hospital management 
induces pressure on coders to engage in upcoding. Alternatively, physicians can be persuaded to 
change their diagnoses to increase revenues, or the hospital may deliberately falsify patient 
records.  
                                                            
10 Medicare is an insurance program for individuals over 65 years and is administered by the U.S. government and 
financed by payroll taxes. Medicaid is an insurance program for families and individuals with low income and is 
financed by state and federal governments.  
11 “Medical coder” is a professional qualification and thus requires obtaining certification based on educational 
background and successful completion of a qualifying examination. 
12 These amounts are based on the average base rate for the year 2005, which was $5,150 for a DRG weight of 1 
(CMS, 2010; OIG, 2001b). 
13 Note that the diagnosis of some of these complicating factors such as asthma or depression requires judgment.  
16 
Since 1990, the General Accounting Office of the United States (GAO) has designated 
Medicare a high-risk program that is vulnerable to improper payments (GAO, 2000). Studies by 
government agencies found that upcoding and other types of improper payments ranged from 
$23.2 billion in 1996 to $44 billion in 2012, comprising 10–14% of total Medicare payments 
(GAO, 2000, 2013; HHS, 2013; OIG, 2001a).
14 Accordingly, health care regulators define the 
prevention of improper payments as one of their strategic goals and use a number of control and 
monitoring tools to reduce the risk of upcoding (CMS, 2013). Two such tools include The 
Hospital Payment Monitoring Program and The Comprehensive Error Rate Testing Program, 
which check medical records to estimate “whether the medical services paid for were allowable, 
medically necessary, accurately coded and sufficiently documented” (CMS, 2004).
15 Hospitals 
that upcode can also be convicted under the False Claims Act (31 USC. §§ 3729–3733), which 
penalizes persons and companies who defraud governmental programs such as Medicare. Qui tam 
actions that are part of the False Claims Act are a powerful instrument against upcoding.
16 In qui 
tam actions whistleblowers with direct knowledge of the fraud scheme initiate the litigation on 
behalf of the government. The Department of Justice (DOJ) in conjunction with other agencies 
such as CMS then makes a judgment on whether to investigate the allegations and intervene 
(DOJ, 2012).  
Data 
We test the hypotheses using data from nonprofit hospitals in one state (California) to 
control for inter-state variations in enforcement activities. Financial and patient data from all 
                                                            
14 These amounts also include payments for services not rendered, payments for services medically unnecessary, and 
services billed without documentation.  
15 Other instruments to prevent upcoding include the requirement for hospitals to use “grouper” software that can 
partially prevent upcoding through built-in checks; the code of ethics, which is the professional standard for the 
medical coder developed by the American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA); and the 
education provided by AHIMA, which emphasizes the undesirability of upcoding (Steinbusch et al., 2007). 
16 During the period of our study about 80% of health care fraud cases were qui tam actions (TAF, 2007).  
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nonprofit general acute-care hospitals located in California are collected from the Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) for the time period 1996 (the first year 
when patient-level data using DRGs are available) to 2007. We focus on general acute-care 
hospitals and exclude specialty hospitals such as children’s hospitals, substance-abuse hospitals, 
and psychiatric hospitals, whose reimbursement rates, production functions, and patient mixes 
differ (Eldenburg et al., 2011).  
We examine upcoding for three distinct DRG families identified by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (1998) as being prone to upcoding and have been used in prior 
research (Becker, Kessler, and McClellan, 2005; Silverman and Skinner, 2004).
17 These DRG 
families are listed as high upcoding risk for two reasons. First, classification of a patient to a 
particular DRG within each of these families involves considerable judgment; therefore it is 
easier for the hospital to make a case that the DRG assignment was based on a medical 
assessment. Second, these DRG families offer financial incentives to upcode. These three DRG 
families are general respiratory ailments (DRG79), circulatory system disorders (DRG144), and 
diabetes and metabolic disorders (DRG296).
18  
Table 1 provides an overview of the DRG families at high risk for upcoding and the 
financial incentives obtained, which are a function of the case weight of each DRG.
19 Based on 
the weight differences within a family and the resulting financial incentives, we classify DRG79 
as the high-incentive family, DRG144 as the medium-incentive family, and DRG296 as the low-
                                                            
17 Use of these DRG families in the analysis provides us with a conservative measure of upcoding, because we focus 
on DRGs that are known as being prone to upcoding. Therefore, enforcement actions are likely to be high for these 
DRGs, reducing the extent of upcoding.  
18 The name indicates the DRG with the highest weight within the family. For a detailed description of DRG79 see 
Silverman and Skinner (2004). 
19 CMS assigns a unique case weight to each DRG. The case weight reflects the average level of resources for an 
average Medicare patient belonging to the DRG, relative to the average level of resources for all Medicare patients. 
The case weights are intended to account for cost variations between different types of treatments. More expensive 
conditions are assigned higher DRG case weights (CMS, 2005b; OIG, 2001b).   
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incentive family. To calculate the specific upcoding incentive in dollars, we apply the hospital’s 
base rate for a DRG weight of 1. This rate is adjusted for area-specific wage differences and thus 
differs across hospitals. The average base rate for the year 2005 for a DRG weight of 1 is $5,150 
(CMS, 2010; OIG, 2001b). We use this rate as the base for the dollar values reported in Table 1, 
Panel B, from which it can be seen that hospitals have substantial incentives to upcode depending 
on the DRG family. Table 1, Panel C provides an overview of the average discharges in each of 
these DRG families per hospital and year in an absolute as well as relative sense. Taken together, 
these three DRG families represent at least ten percent of all discharges in the average hospital 
per year.  
- Table 1 here - 
In our empirical tests, the time period 1996–2007 is divided into two sub-periods with 
crucial differences in regulators’ enforcement of hospitals’ upcoding behavior. In particular, 
before the release of the aforementioned HHS study in 1998, regulators were not aware of the 
variations in upcoding risk of different DRG families. Consequently, there was no credible 
justification for hospitals to differ in their upcoding patterns due to differences in regulatory 
oversight. Only after the release of this study did regulators have knowledge about the variability 
in upcoding risk and could start enforcement actions. Therefore, to test our theory about the 
interplay between regulatory leniency and upcoding by beneficent nonprofits, we divide our 
analysis into two parts.  
For the first part, we investigate regulatory enforcement actions for the period 1996–1998. 
By investigating enforcement actions for upcoding conducted before regulators were aware of the 
higher upcoding risk posed by these three DRG families, we can examine whether beneficent 
nonprofit hospitals enjoyed less stringent regulatory enforcement than their non-beneficent peers. 
Thus, to test H1, we use a sample of 557 hospital-year observations for the period 1996 to 1998  
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and identify hospitals that were convicted for upcoding from False Claim Act settlement 
agreements of the DOJ as of 1999 for upcoding during the time period 1996–1998.  
Second, we focus on the time period 1999–2007, which allows us to examine whether 
beneficent hospitals, after they have observed regulatory preferences conveyed in the 
enforcement process, exploit this regulatory leniency and upcode more than their non-beneficent 
peers. To test H2 we use a sample of 1,447 hospital-year observations for the period 1999–2007 
and investigate whether there is a positive association between the provision of unprofitable 
services and upcoding in the three aforementioned DRG families. 
Research method 
Test of H1 
H1 proposes that regulators are less likely to convict beneficent nonprofit hospitals under 
the False Claims Act. We examine the likelihood of being convicted for upcoding using the 
following logistic regression model, where subscript i represents the hospital and t the year: 
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Dependent variable. The Conviction Dummy is an indicator variable that is equal to one in 
the years a hospital engaged in upcoding as documented in the False Claims Act convictions, and 
zero otherwise. To identify convicted hospitals, we collect data from the False Claims Act 
settlement agreements published by the U.S. Department of Justice, which allows us to identify 
the exact period in which the convicted hospitals engaged in upcoding.  
Predictor variables. Our measures of beneficence are indigent care (%Indigent), which is 
the share of indigent patients as a percentage of the hospital’s total patient population (measured 
in patient days) and medical education, defined as the number of residents per inpatient bed  
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(Resident-to-bed ratio). H1 predicts a negative coefficient on β1 and β2, i.e., a higher percentage 
of indigent patients and a higher resident-to-bed ratio will be associated with a lower likelihood 
of conviction. 
Hospital-level control variables. We use several variables that control for the hospital’s 
operations and its financial condition. These include two hospital-specific motives to engage in 
upcoding, i.e., to meet a zero-earnings benchmark (Eldenburg et al., 2011; Hoerger, 1991; Leone 
and Van Horn, 2005) and to obtain incentive compensation (Brickley and Van Horn, 2002; 
Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2003; Lambert and Larcker, 1995). To identify hospitals that just meet 
the zero-earnings benchmark, we group hospital-years into intervals based on net income divided 
by total assets at the beginning of the year. Following Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999), 
we determine our categories of scaled earnings based upon 2(IQR)n
-1/3 leading to a bin width of 
0.02.
20 Thus, hospitals whose net income divided by lagged total assets lies in the interval [0, 
0.02] are identified as having just met the benchmark, and are coded as 1 in the Zero Earnings 
Benchmark Dummy.  
To construct the incentive compensation variable, we conduct a hospital-level variable of 
pay for performance (P4P). We follow Eldenburg et al.’s (2011) version of Sloan’s (1993) model 
and regress the change in log of managerial compensation on the change in return on asset (ROA). 
Since our dataset does not include compensation details for individual managers or the CEO, we 
use the annual sum of direct salaries, bonuses, and benefits of the top hospital administrators 
including the CEO, Medical Director, Nursing Director, and their assistants as our measure of 
compensation (Total Compensation) (Eldenburg et al., 2011). We scale this variable by the 
number of full-time equivalent employees (FTEs) in the top administrative team to obtain an 
individual score. We also include the Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI) to control for the 
                                                            
20 IQR is the sample interquartile range and n is the number of observations.    
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influence of competition on incentive compensation and the standard deviation of ROA over 
three years to control for earnings volatility (StdROA). We exploit the panel structure of our 
dataset and estimate the following model for the time period 1996 to 2007 using panel-specific 
random parameters: 
            ∆    
     	              
     
   	     	   ∆       	          	             	        (2) 
where subscript i relates to an individual hospital and t to year. Based on the coefficient 
ni1,	which is our hospital-specific measure of P4P, we create a dummy (P4P Dummy) that equals 
one for all hospitals that have a positive ni1.  
Equation 1 includes the hospital’s return on asset (ROA). A higher level of profitability 
could likely increase regulators’ scrutiny towards a hospital’s coding practices. We also include 
the Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968) (Zscore) to capture the level of financial distress of a hospital. 
Soderstrom (1993) provides some evidence that hospitals in poor financial condition engage in 
more upcoding. We adjust the original formula and replace the market value of equity with the 
book value of equity (Altman and Saunders, 1997). To control for the hospital’s patient mix, we 
include the percentage of Medicare patients (%Medicare) treated by the hospital measured in 
patient days.
21 Although the DRG classification system is used by Medicaid as well as most 
major insurers, Medicare is the only insurer that fully links reimbursement to the DRG 
classification system (Reinhardt, 2006).  
We control for the hospital’s case mix index (CMI), which captures the average severity of 
illness of patients and controls for the potential that a beneficent hospital might admit more 
severely ill patients. We also control for hospital size by including the natural logarithm of the 
                                                            
21 As a robustness check, we also estimate the model using the percentage of Medicare patients treated by the 
hospital measured in patient discharges for the three specific DRG families (DRG79, DRG144, and DRG296). All 
results remain the same (untabulated).  
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number of discharges (Log Discharges), as larger hospitals might have greater regulatory clout 
(Carpenter, 2004). Furthermore, we include the natural logarithm of the number of board 
members (Log Boardsize) to control for monitoring effectiveness. A larger board might lead to a 
lower monitoring effectiveness because of dysfunctional behavior, such as free-rider problems 
(Aggarwal, Evans, and Nanda, 2011; Yermack, 1996), and thus enable more upcoding. We 
further address the possibility that a hospital is church-owned (Church Dummy) and include 
additional controls for hospital membership in a multi-hospital system (System Dummy) and 
location in a rural area (Rural Dummy).  
Hospital-market-level control variables. We include the Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI) 
to measure the level of competition within a local hospital market (Kwoka Jr, 1985). Consistent 
with prior research (Silverman and Skinner, 2004; Wennberg and Cooper, 1999), we use hospital 
service areas to determine local hospital markets. Higher competition might lead to more 
financial pressure and thus encourage more upcoding (Silverman and Skinner, 2004). Finally, we 
obtain data on the median household income per hospital service area from the U.S. Census 
Bureau and include the natural logarithm of that income (Log Median Household Income) to 
control for population differences across local hospital markets.  
Our final sample for testing H1 consists of 203 nonprofit hospitals and 557 hospital-year 
observations. Table 2 provides an overview of hospitals convicted after 1998 for conducting 
upcoding during the time period 1996–1998. The number of convictions has a slightly increasing 
trend over the time period of our analysis, both in an absolute as well as relative sense. Table 3 
provides an overview and definitions of the variables we use. Descriptive statistics for the sample 
used to test H1 are summarized in Table 4. The mean (median) revenue for the sample is $232 
million ($168 million). The mean (median) net income for the sample is $4.77 million ($1.91 
million). Mean (median) total assets are $120 million ($78 million). The mean (median) return on  
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assets is 3.1 percent (3.4 percent). The mean (median) number of discharges is 9,389 (8,079). The 
skewness of these distributions suggests that the sample includes more small hospitals than large 
hospitals, which is consistent with prior studies (Eldenburg et al., 2011). The average hospital has 
about 40.9 percent Medicare patients, a case mix index of 1.08, and 15 board members. Roughly 
13.9 percent of the hospitals are located in rural areas, 22.4 percent are church-owned, and almost 
half (49.7 percent) belong to a system. The mean (median) Herfindahl-Hirshman index is 0.20 
(0.12), and the mean median household income is $39,460. On average 11.4 percent of the 
hospitals just meet the zero-earnings benchmark. About 43.6 percent of the hospitals in our 
sample have incentive compensation based on financial performance. About 1.24 percent of all 
patients treated are indigent, the mean resident-to-bed ratio is 4.5 percent, and about 22.5 percent 
of hospitals in our sample provide medical education. 
- Tables 2, 3, and 4 here - 
Test of H2  
H2 predicts that subsequent to observing regulatory enforcement behavior, beneficent 
nonprofit hospitals upcode more than other hospitals. To test H2 we investigate the association 
between upcoding and the extent of provision of two unprofitable services within and across 
DRG families using three different dependent variables in a system of three equations. We 
estimate the equation system using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) (Zellner, 1962), which 
takes into consideration the correlation in the error terms across equations (Wooldridge, 2002). 
This method is appropriate because upcoding strategies are likely to be associated across DRG 
families. That is, a hospital that upcodes in the DRG79 family either has a higher likelihood of 
upcoding in DRG144 and DRG296 families if it is an aggressive upcoder, or has a lower 
likelihood of upcoding in the latter two families if it is a cautious upcoder. Therefore, our three 
equations are unlikely to be independent. To test our assumption, we conduct a Lagrange  
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Multiplier (LM) test proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980). The LM test statistic suggests that 
the residuals of our three equations are not independent (p<0.001). Therefore, we use the 
following SUR model where subscript i represents the hospital, t the year: 
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Dependent variables. X is either DRG Ratio 79, DRG Ratio 144, or DRG Ratio 296. 
There are three equations, one for each DRG family. Our three dependent variables are calculated 
as the ratio of the number of patients coded into the Top DRG divided by the sum of patients 
discharged from all DRGs within a family.  
Patient-level controls variables. To control for other factors that may drive the proportion 
of patients in each DRG within a family, we include the first lag of the DRG ratio (DRG Ratio Xt-
1), the Charlson index (Charlson Index X), and the mortality rate (Mortality Rate X) within the 
DRG. The Charlson index captures the weighted average of a patient’s health status within the 
specific DRG family (Charlson et al., 1987). The index assigns weights (1, 2, 3, 6) based on 
comorbidity (e.g., weight 1 for diabetes, weight 6 for metastatic solid tumor) and age (0 to 5; 
where 1 point is assigned for each decade starting at 50, e.g., 40 to 49 = 0; 50 to 59 = 1). The 
weighting is based on the number of patients per DRG within a family. In addition, we include a 
separate Charlson index calculated for the indigent patient population within the specific DRG 
family only (Charlson Index Indigents X) to control for the possibility that indigents are more 
severely ill when they demand medical services (Hsia and Shen, 2011). The underlying idea of 
the Charlson index is that the more severely ill its patients (i.e., the higher the index) the more 
likely a hospital is to have patients in the Top DRG of the respective DRG family. However, if 
the documentation of comorbidities is adjusted by hospitals to justify their coding choice (CMS,  
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2004; Silverman and Skinner, 2004), then including the Charlson index as a control leads to an 
underestimation of the underlying upcoding behavior. Thus, our measure of upcoding is 
conservative. The mortality rate reflects the proportion of patients who died within a specific 
DRG while at the hospital and the health status of the patient population. Other control variables 
are included as explained in the test of H1. 
Our final sample for testing H2 consists of 187 nonprofit hospitals and 1,447 hospital-year 
observations. Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 5. An average of 22.8 percent of 
patients is coded into the Top DRG for family DRG79, 14.6 percent for family DRG144, and 
33.7 percent for family DRG296. The Charlson index and the mortality rate for family DRG79 
(4.28 and 6.1 percent) are higher on average than for the other two groups (3.44 and 3.45 
Charlson index and 1.5 and 1.6 percent mortality rate, respectively). Thus, patients belonging to 
DRG79 have on average a lower health status. The maximum values of the Charlson indices for 
indigent patients (4 for DRG79, 3.25 for DRG144, and 3 for DRG296) are lower than the mean 
of the overall Charlson index, indicating that the few indigent patients treated in these DRG 
families are on average not more severely ill than other patient populations. As the descriptive 
statistics for the other variables are comparable to the sample for testing H1, we do not describe 
them here in detail.  
- Table 5 here - 
RESULTS  
Test of H1 
Table 6, Panel A, shows the results of estimating equation 1, which examines the likelihood 
of being convicted for upcoding. The negative and significant coefficient on the share of 
indigents (β1) and the resident-to-bed ratio (β2) indicate that hospitals with a higher proportion of 
indigent patients and a higher proportion of residents are less likely to be convicted for upcoding.  
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The coefficient estimates are not only statistically significant but also point to economic 
significance as reported in Table 6, Panel B. In particular, the likelihood of conviction for a 
hospital in the bottom quartile of share of indigents increases by about 26% relative to a hospital 
in the top quartile. The likelihood of conviction for a hospital in the bottom decile of residents per 
bed increases by about 17% relative to a hospital in the top decile. The coefficient on the 
benchmark dummy is marginally significant (p=0.096, two-tailed), suggesting that hospitals that 
have just met the zero earnings benchmark are more likely to be convicted for upcoding. These 
results are consistent with H1; regulators are less likely to convict beneficent nonprofit hospitals. 
In addition, regulators are more likely to convict hospitals that just meet the zero-earnings 
benchmark. 
We also explore the overall level of upcoding during 1996–1998 compared to 1999–2007. 
Table 6, Panel C indicates that there was higher upcoding in the DRG79 and DRG296 families 
during 1996–1998 compared to 1999–2007 (t-values of difference are 8.089 and 6.007 
respectively, p<0.01). These results suggest that upcoding in DRG79 and DRG296 was higher in 
1996–1998 before hospitals could observe regulatory actions.  
The control variables indicate that church hospitals, members of a hospital system, and 
hospitals in more concentrated markets are more likely to be convicted. A higher case mix index, 
i.e., a sicker patient pool and correspondingly higher information asymmetry, increases both the 
ability to upcode and the likelihood of conviction. In sum, the results indicate that regulators 
appear to be paying attention to hospitals that have market power or other opportunities for rent 
extraction. Thus, their lower rate of conviction of beneficent hospitals is likely to be a deliberate 
strategy rather than lack of oversight.   
- Table 6 here - 
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Test of H2  
Table 7 presents the results of estimating the system of three equations using SUR. Recall 
that H2 states beneficent hospitals upcode to a greater extent than their less beneficent peers. The 
results indicate a positive and significant coefficient on %Indigents (β1) for both the high- and the 
medium-incentive groups. The coefficient on the resident-to-bed ratio (β2) is positive and 
significant for all three DRG families. These results indicate support for H2—beneficent hospitals 
exhibit higher upcoding. The results also indicate a positive and significant coefficient on the 
benchmark dummy for the high-incentive DRG family (DRG79). Therefore, hospitals that have 
just met the zero-earnings benchmark are more likely to have upcoded in the high-incentive DRG 
family, but not the medium- or low-incentive DRGs. Upcoding occurs across the board for 
beneficent hospitals, whereas when the motive is to meet the zero-earnings benchmark, upcoding 
occurs only in the high-incentive DRG.  
- Table 7 here - 
Incentive compensation (P4P Dummy) is not associated with higher upcoding. Hospitals 
located in more competitive markets upcode to a greater extent in the high-incentive DRG group. 
Hospitals that are financially healthier, i.e., have a higher Z-score, upcode less in the high-
incentive DRG group. Higher CMI is associated with a higher upcoding ratio, suggesting that 
hospitals with a sicker patient pool and correspondingly higher information asymmetry upcode 
more. System membership is associated with higher upcoding in the high- and low-incentive 
DRG groups.   
Robustness tests 
To provide more robust evidence that the positive association between the provision of 
unprofitable services and upcoding is driven by beneficent hospitals’ legitimacy advantage, we 
re-estimate our system of three equations for the time period 1996–1998, during which hospitals  
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could not observe regulatory enforcement. These results are presented in Table 8. Consistent with 
our theory, a comparison of the estimation results in Tables 7 and 8 indicates that the significant 
relationship between upcoding and the two unprofitable services either disappears (for the 
%Indigents variable) or is not prevalent across all three DRG families (Resident-to-Bed Ratio). 
Overall, the results of our robustness test indicate that beneficent hospitals upcoded more 
aggressively during 1999–2007, after they had observed regulator leniency.  
- Table 8 here - 
Although the SUR estimation takes into consideration the possibility that the upcoding 
behaviors in the three DRG families are jointly determined, we also consider two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) as an alternate econometric specification (Wooldridge, 2002). Specifically, the 
coding behavior for one DRG family (DRG Ratio X, where X could be DRG Ratio 79, DRG 
Ratio 144, or DRG Ratio 296) and the two other DRG families (DRG Ratio Y and DRG Ratio Z, 
where Y and Z are the two other DRG families) might be jointly determined, leading to a 
potential simultaneous-equation bias. Hence, we also include the potentially endogenous 
dependent variables as control variables (DRG Ratio Y and DRG Ratio Z) in our model.    
To use 2SLS, we require instrumental variables (IVs) that are correlated with our 
potentially endogenous variables, i.e., DRG Ratio Y and DRG Ratio Z, but not with the error term 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, the instruments have to be relevant and exogenous. In our setting the 
Charlson index and the mortality rate are likely to meet the requirements for IVs. It seems 
reasonable that the average health status of DRG families Y and Z, measured by the mortality rate 
and the Charlson index, are correlated with the coding outcome in these families (relevance) and, 
furthermore, not related to the coding outcome of DRG family X (exogeneity). Tests of the 
relevance and exogeneity of the instruments confirm that our instruments are valid. A Hausman 
(1978) test indicates no evidence of a simultaneity bias.   
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We re-estimate our model employing alternative measures for our independent variables. 
First, we adjust our benchmark dummy and define hospitals whose net income divided by lagged 
total assets lies in the intervals [0, 0.01] and [0, 0.03], respectively, as having just met the 
benchmark. Applying these different intervals leads to qualitatively similar results. Finally, we 
construct the P4P dummy by using change in net income and the standard deviation of net 
income over three years instead of ROA. Our results remain unchanged.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Economic theory acknowledges that regulators have preferences that may vary across the 
firms that they regulate. However, these preferences have usually been studied either from the 
perspective of regulatory capture (whereby the regulator starts operating for the benefit of the 
organization it is supposed to regulate) or from the perspective of the political economy of the 
supply of regulation to serve politicians’ ambitions. The empirical literatures in finance and 
accounting have typically used a narrower perspective and treat regulations as exogenously 
imposed and consistently applied to all organizations. The strategy and sociology literatures, on 
the other hand, have recognized the endogeneity between regulations and organizations and the 
fact that there is a complicated and dynamic process by which organizations influence regulation 
as well as draw boundaries regarding appropriate compliance—boundaries that can vary within 
and across industries. In this study, we empirically explore such differentiated boundaries in the 
context of the health care industry and the consequence of such differentiation on hospitals’ 
strategic pricing choices.  
Specifically, we posit that nonprofits that provide unprofitable services (beneficent 
nonprofits) are less likely to face regulatory enforcement for mispricing in price-regulated 
markets and, consequent to observing this regulatory leniency, exhibit more mispricing. We draw 
on organizational legitimacy, institutional, and stakeholder management theories to argue that the  
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actions of both regulators and nonprofits are motivated by a desire to protect legitimacy not only 
with stakeholders such as taxpayers and voters who demand compliance stringency, but also 
other sets of voters, nonprofits, and special-interest groups who demand access to unprofitable 
health care services.  
We focus on nonprofit hospitals that provide medical education and access to care for the 
uninsured. The provision of these socially desirable but unprofitable services is essential for 
hospitals’ legitimacy with important stakeholders such as local, state, and federal governments, 
donors as well as other community groups. We examine whether beneficent nonprofits explore 
mispricing via “upcoding”, which involves classifying an ailment as more severe than it actually 
is, to financially compensate for the provision of unprofitable services. Regulatory agencies such 
as CMS are devoted to prevention of such mispricing (CMS, 2013). One set of stakeholders 
expects strict policing from regulators and demands that they crack down on fraudulent activities 
such as mispricing. Another set of stakeholders recognizes the substantial distortions in access to 
health care and is wary that unilateral imposition of regulations could widen the access chasm. 
The latter set of stakeholders, for example, would favorably view a beneficent nonprofit hospital 
that has higher performance on social goals. Regulators have to find a way to navigate the often 
conflicting expectations of stakeholders and emerge with their legitimacy unscathed. Fixed-price 
regulation prevents regulators from using the price mechanism to correct such distortions to 
access. We explore whether regulators exhibit leniency in the form of fewer convictions of 
beneficent nonprofit hospitals. 
Our results indicate that beneficent hospitals are less likely to be convicted for upcoding 
under the False Claims Act. Through differential enforcement, regulators provide hospitals with 
varying degrees of latitude in complying with the Act. We next examine whether, after observing 
the less stringent regulatory enforcement, beneficent nonprofit hospitals upcode to a greater  
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extent. We find that beneficence, measured as the share of indigent patients and the provision of 
medical education, is positively associated with upcoding. The leniency of regulators towards 
beneficent nonprofit hospitals coupled with their higher upcoding permits these hospitals to 
obtain higher prices and partially cross-subsidize unprofitable services. Therefore, beneficent 
nonprofit hospitals can continue to provide unprofitable but critical services, which allow them to 
protect their own legitimacy, as well as contributes to the legitimacy of health care regulators 
among stakeholders who demand these services. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, by demonstrating the interplay 
between regulators and regulated organizations in industries where both parties act to protect their 
legitimacy, our study contributes to the stream of strategic management literature that emphasizes 
the importance of stakeholders’ influence on the interaction between regulators and organizations 
(e.g., Hiatt and Park, 2012). Second, while the dominant assumption in archival research in many 
different fields is that regulation is exogenous and uniformly imposed, our study articulates the 
simultaneity between regulators’ and organizations’ actions and thus expands our limited 
understanding of the complex dynamics surrounding the enforcement of regulation (Bonardi et 
al., 2005; Edelman and Suchman, 1997). Third, we show that in some instances regulatory 
judgment could potentially not be welfare reducing. In particular, in our setting, although the 
beneficent hospital benefits from upcoding, a portion of the increased income is likely diverted 
towards social welfare. Finally, by showing that upcoding might be an alternative strategy for 
beneficent hospitals to cover costs of unprofitable services under fixed-price reimbursement, our 
study contributes to the strategic management literature exploring nonprofits’ strategic reactions 
to shifts or declines in funding (e.g., Bielefeld, 1992, 1994; McMurtry et al., 1991; Nielsen, 1986; 
Provan, 1987).   
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Our study has several limitations. First, we focus only on three DRG families. Inclusion of 
more DRG families in the analysis will provide more complete results, but will substantially 
increase the complexity of the analysis because we need to account for interactions between 
families. We believe that the use of only three DRG families provides a conservative analysis 
because these particular families have been recognized for over a decade as being prone to 
upcoding. Second, although we include two measures to control for patient health status, i.e., 
Charlson index and mortality rate, we cannot conclusively state that every case where there is a 
higher proportion of DRGs in the top of the DRG family is indeed upcoding. Third, though our 
analysis focuses only on California, our results should be generalizable to other nonprofit 
hospitals not only in the United States but also in countries that use DRG-type reimbursement 
systems such as Australia, Germany, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Finally, the U.S. 
health care system has recently been subject to a significant regulatory overhaul stemming from 
the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). One of the main goals of the ACA is to lower the 
number of uninsured by expanding public and private insurance coverage. In particular, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the legislation will reduce the number of 
uninsured by about 30 million. However, the CBO also estimates that over 20 million residents 
will remain uninsured (CBO, 2012), suggesting that hospitals will continue to incur substantial 
costs from providing care to that population.  
Our results indicate that regulators are likely to provide greater latitude to beneficent 
nonprofit hospitals. The weaker regulatory enforcement likely serves as a signal of the greater 
legitimacy enjoyed by such hospitals from regulators and community watchdogs. It would be 
fruitful to explore this issue in other industries. For example, research could explore whether 
firms that signal the importance of non-monetary goals such as environmental sustainability or  
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employee learning (e.g., firms that communicate the importance of the triple bottom line) obtain 
some leniency from financial regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  
From a social welfare perspective, upcoding helps meet some of the cost of providing 
indigent care or medical education. Insured individuals may perceive upcoding as a tax that helps 
in meeting important social needs and serves as an alternative to subsidies (which would directly 
or indirectly lead to higher taxes). Whether or not upcoding results in a welfare benefit or loss is 
an empirical question that is beyond the scope of our study. Future research could explore reasons 
for variations in regulatory oversight and their consequences in greater detail.    
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Table 1. Overview of DRG monetary incentives 
Panel A: Description of DRG groups 
Incentive 
Classification of 
DRG Family
a 
DRG 
Number 
(based on 
ICD-9-CM)
b 
Description  DRG 
Weight
c 
Revenue 
Estimate
d ($) 
High Incentives 
Family (General 
Respiratory 
Ailments) 
79 (TOP)  Respiratory infections and inflammations with 
complicating and comorbidity factors (cc)  1.59 8,188.50 
80  Respiratory infections without (w/o) cc  0.85  4,377.50 
  89  Pneumonia with (w) cc  1.05  5,407.50 
  90  Pneumonia w/o cc  0.62  3,193.00 
Medium 
Incentives Family 
(Circulatory 
System 
Disorders) 
132  Atherosclerosis w cc  0.64  3,296.00 
133  Atherosclerosis w/o cc  0.54  2,781.00 
138  Cardiac arrhythmia and conduction disorders w 
cc  0.84 4,326.00 
139  Cardiac arrhythmia and conduction disorders 
w/o cc  0.52 2,678.00 
 140  Angina  Pectoris  0.53  2,729.50 
  141  Syncope and collapse w cc  0.76  3,914.00 
  142  Syncope and collapse w/o cc  0.59  3,038.50 
  144 (TOP)  Other circulatory system diagnoses w cc  1.25  6,437.50 
  145  Other circulatory system diagnoses w/o cc  0.59  3,038.50 
Low Incentives 
Family (Diabetes 
and 
Nutritional/Meta
bolic Disorders) 
182  Esophagitis, gastroenteritis and miscellaneous 
digestive disorders age > 17 w cc  0.79 4,068.50 
294 Diabetes  age  >35  0.78 4,017.00 
296 (TOP)  Nutritional and miscellaneous metabolic 
disorders age > 17 w cc  0.84 4,326.00 
 297  Nutritional and miscellaneous metabolic 
disorders age > 17 w/o cc  0.50 2,575.00 
Notes to Table 1, Panel A:  
a Based on the financial benefit from upcoding from one of the lower-revenue DRG numbers to the highest-revenue 
DRG number.  
b “TOP” refers to the DRG that has the highest revenue in the DRG family. ICD-9-CM refers to the International 
Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification. This classification is used to assign diagnostic and 
procedure codes associated with inpatient, outpatient, and physician office utilization in the United States.  
c Refers to the weight assigned by CMS to each DRG. The weight reflects the average level of resources for an 
average Medicare patient belonging to the DRG, relative to the average level of resources for all Medicare patients. 
The weights are intended to account for cost variations between different types of treatments. More expensive 
conditions are assigned higher DRG weights. 
d Refers to the revenue estimate per DRG in dollar calculated as the DRG weight times the average base rate for the 
year 2005 for a DRG weight of 1 ($5,150). 
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Panel B: Monetary incentives per DRG groups 
Incentive 
Classification of 
DRG Family  
Difference 
between Top 
DRG and 
Family 
Average
a 
Average 
Payment 
Incentive 
($)
b 
Max. 
Difference
c 
Max. 
Payment 
Incentive 
($)
d 
Min. 
Difference
e 
Min. 
Payment 
Incentive 
($)
f 
High Incentives 
(General 
Respiratory 
Ailments) 
0.75  3,862.50 0.97 4,995.50 0.54  2,781.00 
Medium 
Incentives 
(Circulatory 
system disorders) 
0.62  3,212.31 0.73 3,759.50 0.41  2,111.50 
Low Incentives 
(Diabetes and 
nutritional/metab
olic disorders) 
0.15 772.50  0.34  1,751.00  0.06  309.00 
Notes to Table 1, Panel B:  
a Computed as the difference between the TOP DRG weight and the average DRG weight of the other DRGs in the 
family.  
b Computed as the average difference between TOP DRG weight and family average weight in dollars, i.e., 
difference in weight times the average base rate for the year 2005 for a DRG weight of 1 ($5,150). 
c Computed as the difference between the TOP DRG weight and the lowest DRG weight per family.  
d Computed as the maximum difference between TOP DRG weight and lowest DRG weight per family in dollar, i.e., 
difference in weight times the average base rate for the year 2005 for a DRG weight of 1 ($5,150). 
e Computed as the difference between the TOP DRG weight and the second highest DRG weight per family. 
f Computed as the minimum difference between TOP DRG weight and second highest DRG weight per family in 
dollar, i.e., difference in weight times the average base rate for the year 2005 for a DRG weight of 1 ($5,150). 
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Panel C: Overview of discharges in DRG families per hospital and year
a 
Year 
Mean 
Number 
of 
Discharge
s  DRG 
79 
Family
b 
DRG 79 
Family 
Discharge
s in % of 
Total 
Discharge
s 
Mean 
Number 
of 
Discharge
s DRG 
144 
Family
b 
DRG 144 
Family 
Discharge
s in % of 
Total 
Discharge
s 
Mean 
Number 
of 
Discharge
s DRG 
296 
Family
b 
DRG 296 
Family 
Discharge
s in % of 
Total 
Discharge
s 
Mean 
Number 
of  
Discharge
s in all 
three 
DRG 
Families 
All three 
DRG 
Families 
Discharges 
in % of 
Total 
Discharges 
1996  313 4.3 308 4.0 238 3.1 859 11.4 
1997  343 4.5 324 4.1 255 3.1 922 11.7 
1998  345 4.4 320 4.0 263 3.2 928 11.6 
1999  377 4.9 329 4.0 283 3.4 989 12.3 
2000  341 4.3 338 3.9 298 3.4 977 11.6 
2001  352 4.3 333 3.7 306 3.5 991 11.5 
2002  339 4.4 321 3.8 321 3.8 981  12 
2003  374 4.4 324 3.5 326 3.6  1024  11.5 
2004  336 3.9 335 3.4 337 3.5  1008  10.8 
2005  378 4.3 337 3.4 343 3.6  1058  11.3 
2006  339 3.8 338 3.4 371 3.8  1048 11 
2007  318 3.5 337 3.3 347 3.5  1002  10.3 
Notes to Table 1, Panel C:  
a The data are obtained from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD).  
 
Table 2. Overview of convicted hospitals per year
a 
Year  Number of Hospitals
b Number of convicted Hospitals
  % of Sample 
1996 186  21  11.2 
1997 186  22  11.8 
1998 185  24  12.9 
 557  67  12.0 
Notes to Table 2:  
a Data from the False Claim Act settlement agreements of the U.S. Department of Justice. The data relate to 
convictions that occurred after 1998 for upcoding conducted between 1996 and 1998.  
b Number of all California nonprofit general acute care hospitals per year. The data are obtained from the Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). 
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Table 3. Overview of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables 
   DRG Ratio  
Continuous variable between 0 and 1; calculated as the number of 
patients in the TOP DRG divided by the total number of patients in the 
DRG group. 
   Conviction Dummy 
1 in the years a hospital has conducted upcoding as reported in the 
convictions for upcoding under the False Claims Act, and zero 
otherwise. 
Predictor Variables 
   Percentage of Indigents  Indigent patient days as percentage of total patient days. 
   Resident-to-Bed Ratio  Number of residents trained per inpatient bed. 
Patient-Level Control Variables 
   Charlson Index  
Index that captures the weighted average patient’s health status within a 
DRG group; score combines assigned weights (1, 2, 3, 6) based on 
comorbidity (e.g., weight 1 for diabetes, weight 6 for metastatic solid 
tumor) and assigned weights (0 to 5) based on age (1 point for each 
decade starting at 50, e.g., 40 to 49 = 0; 50 to 59 = 1); weighting is 
based on number of patients per DRG. 
   Charlson Index for Indigents 
Index that captures the weighted average indigent patient’s health status 
within a DRG group; calculated in the same manner as the Charlson 
index. 
   Mortality Rate  Rate that captures the share of people that died within a DRG group 
during the stay at the hospital.  
Hospital-Level Control Variables 
   Benchmark Dummy  1 if the hospital has just met the zero-earnings benchmark (i.e., 0 to 0.02 
based on 2*IQR*n
-1/3), 0 otherwise.  
   P4P Dummy  1 if positive P4P incentives exist, 0 otherwise. 
   (First lag of) ROA  (First lag of) net income divided by total assets. 
   Z-Score 
1.2 times working capital divided by total assets plus 1.4 times retained 
earnings divided by total assets plus 3.3 times earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by total assets plus 0.6 times total equity divided by 
total liabilities plus revenue divided by total assets. 
   Percentage of Medicare   Medicare patient days as percentage of total patient days. 
   Case Mix Index (CMI)  Case mix index of hospital. 
   Log Discharges  Natural logarithm of number of discharges. 
   Log Boardsize  Natural logarithm of number of board members. 
   System Hospital Dummy  1 if the hospital belongs to a system, 0 otherwise. 
   Rural Hospital Dummy  1 if the hospital is located in a rural area, 0 otherwise. 
   Church Dummy  1 if the hospital is church-owned, 0 otherwise. 
Hospital-Market-Level Control Variables 
   Competition Index (HHI)  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; sum of squared market shares per local 
market. 
   Log Median Household Income  Natural logarithm of the median household income per hospital service 
area.  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for years 1996 to 1998 (N=557)
a 
Variable Mean  Std.  Min.  Q1  Median  Q3  Max. 
Dependent Variables 
DRG Ratio 79  0.281  0.117  0.023  0.186  0.256  0.337  0.631 
DRG Ratio 144  0.122  0.065  0.007  0.076  0.114  0.158  0.359 
DRG Ratio 296  0.357  0.076  0.146  0.309  0.353  0.405  0.548 
Predictor Variables 
%Indigents 1.238  2.021  0  0  0.299  1.837  10.227 
Resident-to-Bed Ratio  0.045  0.124  0  0  0  0  0.901 
Patient-Level Control Variables 
Charlson Index 79  4.136  0.461  2.438  3.896  4.200  4.445  4.989 
Charlson Index Ind. 79  0.490  0.975  0  0  0  0.667  5.000 
Mortality Rate 79  0.067  0.024  0  0.052  0.066  0.081  0.132 
Charlson Index 144  3.276  0.409  2.010  3.036  3.307  3.564  4.154 
Charlson Index Ind. 144  0.682  1.110  0  0  0  0.481  4.333 
Mortality Rate 144  0.015  0.010  0  0.008  0.014  0.020  0.052 
Charlson Index 296  3.362  0.534  1.782  3.074  3.404  3.700  4.525 
Charlson Index Ind. 296  0.394  0.845  0  0  0  0.481  5.000 
Mortality Rate 296  0.016  0.012  0  0.007  0.014  0.023  0.062 
Hospital-Level Control Variables 
Benchmark Dummy  0.114  0.318  0  0  0  0  1 
P4P Dummy  0.436  0.496  0  0  0  1  1 
Revenues in 000s  231,995  221,713  8,853  79,873  168,142  312,675  1,254,061 
Net Income  in 000s  4,771  11,823  -16,861  -494  1,909  6,626  67,563 
Total Assets  in 000s 120,112  129,190  2,159  33,523 78,352  166,459  718,047 
ROAt-1 0.031  0.092  -0.290  -0.002  0.034  0.070  0.341 
Zscore 3.301  1.946  -0.649  2.303  2.946  3.653  14.386 
%Medicare 40.943  13.816  7.849  31.405  41.008  51.680  71.963 
CMI 1.084  0.192  0.740  0.950  1.050  1.190  1.750 
Teaching Dummy  0.225  0.418  0  0  0  0  1 
Discharges 9,389  6,624  307  4,064  8,079  13,306  30,653 
Log Discharges  8.834  0.895  5.740  8.310  8.997  9.496  10.326 
Boardsize 14.71  5.19  2  12  15  18  29 
Log Boardsize  2.604  0.466  0.693  2.485  2.708  2.890  3.367 
System Dummy  0.497  0.500  0  0  0  1  1 
Rural Dummy  0.139  0.345  0  0  0  0  1 
Church Dummy  0.224  0.417  0  0  0  0  1 
Hospital-Market-Level Control Variables 
HHI 0.195  0.235  0.015  0.040  0.117  0.273  1 
Median Household 
Income in $ 
39,460 7,826  27,885  33,828  37,655  44,998  61,257 
Log Median 
Household Income 
10.565 0.190  10.236  10.429  10.536  10.714  11.023 
Notes to Table 4:  
a The data are obtained from the OSHPD and the U.S. Census Bureau. See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for years 1999 to 2007 (N=1,447)
a 
Variable Mean  Std.    Min.  Q1  Median  Q3  Max. 
Dependent Variables 
DRG Ratio 79  0.228  0.093  0.022  0.167  0.216  0.282  0.541 
DRG Ratio 144  0.146  0.078  0  0.094  0.134  0.182  0.423 
DRG Ratio 296  0.337  0.069  0.167  0.292  0.337  0.379  0.547 
Predictor Variables 
%Indigents 1.392  1.902  0  0  0.381  2.271  7.142 
Resident-to-Bed Ratio  0.047  0.132  0  0  0  0  0.680 
Patient-Level Control Variables 
Charlson Index 79  4.282  0.453  2.739  4.025  4.322  4.601  5.221 
Charlson Index Ind. 79  0.232  0.715  0  0  0  0  4.000 
Mortality Rate 79  0.061  0.025  0  0.043  0.059  0.076  0.134 
Charlson Index 144  3.444  0.400  2.315  3.196  3.476  3.700  4.363 
Charlson Index Ind. 144  0.233  0.667  0  0  0  0  3.250 
Mortality Rate 144  0.015  0.011  0  0.008  0.014  0.020  0.060 
Charlson Index 296  3.452  0.476  2.086  3.165  3.476  3.750  4.595 
Charlson Index Ind. 296  0.184  0.551  0  0  0  0  3.000 
Mortality Rate 296  0.016  0.010  0  0.008  0.014  0.022  0.048 
Hospital-Level Control Variables 
Benchmark Dummy  0.109  0.312  0  0  0  0  1 
P4P Dummy  0.503  0.500  0  0  1  1  1 
Revenues in 000s  529,218  562,417  9,149  145,342  334,718  716,537  3,081,531 
Net Income  in 000s  9,075  20,605  -30,071  -520  3,070  11,179  94,391 
Total Assets  in 000s  181,822 234,249 3,123  43,097 104,975 211,894  1,374,073 
ROAt-1 0.027  0.105  -0.363  -0.011  0.033  0.078  0.314 
Zscore 4.555  2.051  0.620  3.052  4.164  5.693  11.057 
%Medicare 46.688  14.065  12.051  38.276  47.506  56.929  77.984 
CMI 1.117  0.213  0.740  0.970  1.080  1.230  1.807 
Teaching Dummy  0.244  0.430  0  0  0  0  1 
Discharges 10,721  7,722  310  4,170  9,392  15,612  31,598 
Log Discharges  8.930  0.970  5.737  8.336  9.148  9.656  10.351 
Boardsize 15.22  5.28  2  12  15  18  30 
Log Boardsize  2.645  0.440  0.693  2.485  2.708  2.890  3.401 
System Dummy  0.540  0.499  0  0  1  1  1 
Rural Dummy  0.161  0.368  0  0  0  0  1 
Church Dummy  0.146  0.353  0  0  0  0  1 
Hospital-Market-Level Control Variables 
HHI 0.230  0.245  0.015  0.053  0.157  0.358  1 
Median Household 
Income in $  
47,586 10,346  30,915  40,007 44,360  53,564  74,557 
Log Median 
Household Income  10.748 0.212  10.339  10.597  10.700  10.889  11.219 
Notes to Table 5:  
a The data are obtained from the OSHPD and the U.S. Census Bureau. See Table 3 for variable definitions.  
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Table 6. Probability of being convicted for upcoding 
Panel A. Logistic regression estimation of the probability of being convicted for upcoding during 
1996 to 1998
a 
 
Variables  Pred.  Conviction Dummy 
Predictor Variables 
%Indigents -  -30.696*  (0.054) 
Resident-to-Bed Ratio  -  -4.531** (0.021) 
Hospital-Level Control Variables 
Benchmark Dummy    0.955** (0.039) 
P4P Dummy    0.388 (0.426) 
ROA   3.730  (0.335) 
Zscore   -0.096  (0.584) 
%Medicare  -1.077  (0.609) 
CMI   3.218**  (0.013) 
Log Discharges    0.035 (0.942) 
Log Boardsize    0.860 (0.229) 
System Dummy    2.255*** (0.002) 
Rural Dummy    -1.147 (0.206) 
Church Dummy    1.906*** (<0.001) 
Hospital-Market-Level Control Variables 
HHI   2.802**  (0.038) 
Log Median Household Income    0.595 (0.701) 
Constant   -16.520  (0.273) 
    
Year Dummies    Yes 
Clustered by    Hospital 
Observations   557 
R-squared     0.345 
Notes to Table 6, Panel A:  
a p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed), year dummies included but not reported, 
standard errors clustered by hospital, variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. See Table 3 for variable 
definitions. 
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Panel B. Marginal effects
b 
 
  
Variables Marginal  Effects 
%Indigents   
Probability of %Indigents at Upper Quartile  .024  
Probability of %Indigents at Lower Quartile  .055 
Interquartile Marginal Change  -.031 
Unconditional Probability of Conviction  .12 
Interquartile Marginal Change in Probability of Conviction for Upper Quartile -25.8% 
   
Resident-to-Bed Ratio   
Probability of Resident-to-Bed Ratio at Upper Decile  .020  
Probability of Resident-to-Bed Ratio at Lower Decile  .040 
Interdecile Marginal Change  -.02 
Unconditional Probability of Conviction   .12 
Interdecile Marginal Change in Conviction for Upper Decile  -16.7% 
Notes to Table 6, Panel B:  
b The marginal effects presented here are calculated based on model 1 as reported in Table 6, Panel A. All variables 
except for %Indigents and Resident-to-Bed Ratio, respectively, are at their mean values to calculate the probabilities 
at upper and lower quartile and decile of %Indigents and Resident-to-Bed Ratio, respectively. The unconditional 
probability of conviction is the number of convicted hospitals relative to the total number of hospitals. 
 
Panel C. Comparison of coding behavior across sample periods
c 
 
 1996–1998  1999–2007   
Variable Mean  Mean  Difference  
(1996–1998 to 1999–2007) 
Dependent Variables     
DRG Ratio 79  0.281  0.228  0.053*** 
DRG Ratio 144  0.122  0.146  -0.024*** 
DRG Ratio 296  0.357  0.337  0.020*** 
Patient-Level Control Variables     
Charlson Index 79  4.136  4.282  -0.146*** 
Mortality Rate 79  0.067  0.061  0.006*** 
Charlson Index 144  3.276  3.444  -0.168*** 
Mortality Rate 144  0.015  0.015  0 
Charlson Index 296  3.362  3.452  -0.09*** 
Mortality Rate 296  0.016  0.016  0 
Notes to Table 6, Panel C:  
c The differences in coding behavior presented here are based on the mean values as reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 7. Seemingly unrelated regression estimation of upcoding as a function of beneficence for 
years 1999 to 2007 (N=1,447)
a 
Variables  Pred.    DRG Ratio79  
(High Incentives) 
DRG Ratio144 
(Medium Incentives) 
DRG Ratio296  
(Low Incentives) 
Predictor Variables 
%Indigents  +  0.263*** (0.002)  0.138** (0.038)  0.032 (0.707) 
Resident-to-Bed Ratio  +  0.026* (0.064)  0.065*** (<0.001)  0.024* (0.085) 
Patient-Level Control Variables 
DRG Ratio Xt-1    0.726*** (<0.001)  0.695*** (<0.001)  0.500*** (<0.001) 
Charlson Index X    0.022*** (<0.001)  0.004 (0.239)  0.033*** (<0.001) 
Charlson Index 
Indigents X    0.002 (0.310)  0.002 (0.235)  -0.001 (0.970) 
Mortality Rate X    0.313*** (<0.001)  0.461*** (<0.001)  0.513*** (<0.001) 
Hospital-Level Control Variables 
Benchmark Dummy    0.008* (0.080)  -0.003 (0.345)  0.003 (0.433) 
P4P Dummy    -0.001 (0.651)  -0.002 (0.270)  -0.002 (0.563) 
ROAt-1    0.011 (0.407)  -0.007 (0.505)  -0.003 (0.836) 
Zscore    -0.002** (0.022)  -0.001 (0.718)  0.001 (0.593) 
%Medicare    0.013 (0.256)  -0.017* (0.054)  0.001 (0.936) 
CMI    0.013* (0.095)  0.023*** (<0.001)  0.010 (0.232) 
Log Discharges    -0.002 (0.328)  0.004** (0.015)  -0.009*** (<0.001) 
Log Boardsize    -0.001 (0.893)  0.004 (0.103)  0.001 (0.954) 
Church Dummy    -0.005 (0.211)  -0.001 (0.859)  0.002 (0.553) 
System Dummy    0.006** (0.046)  0.002 (0.339)  0.010*** (<0.001) 
Rural Dummy    -0.004 (0.456)  -0.007* (0.058)  -0.007 (0.183) 
Hospital-Market-Level Control Variables 
HHI    -0.026*** (0.001)  -0.001 (0.848)  0.007 (0.364) 
Log Median Household 
Income    0.0130* (0.099)  -0.006 (0.347)  -0.003 (0.703) 
Constant    -0.208** (0.015)  -0.043** (0.011)  0.139 (0.112) 
        
Year Dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustered by    Hospital  Hospital  Hospital 
Observations   1,447  1,447  1,447 
R-squared   0.704  0.744  0.455 
Notes to Table 7:  
 a p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed), year dummies included but not reported, 
standard errors clustered by hospital, variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. See Table 3 for variable 
definitions. 
 
 
 
 
   
49 
Table 8. Seemingly unrelated regression estimation of upcoding as a function of beneficence for 
years 1996 to 1998 (N=522)
a 
Variables Pred.  DRG Ratio79  
(High Incentives) 
DRG Ratio144 
(Medium Incentives) 
DRG Ratio296  
(Low Incentives) 
Predictor Variables 
%Indigents    -0.030 (0.869)  -0.084 (0.385)  0.038 (0.807) 
Resident-to-Bed Ratio    0.053* (0.054)  0.033** (0.045)  0.003 (0.895) 
Patient-Level Control Variables 
DRG Ratio Xt-1    0.705*** (<0.001)  0.586*** (<0.001)  0.468*** (<0.001) 
Charlson Index X    0.016** (0.035)  -0.007 (0.150)  0.031*** (<0.001) 
Charlson Index 
Indigent X    0.003 (0.180)  0.002 (0.389)  0.004* (0.069) 
Mortality Rate X    0.381*** (0.002)  0.637*** (<0.001)  0.290 (0.171) 
Hospital-Level Control Variables 
Benchmark Dummy     0.002 (0.848)  -0.007 (0.172)  -0.004 (0.626) 
P4P Dummy    -0.005 (0.393)  -0.001 (0.824)  -0.004 (0.495) 
ROAt-1    0.004 (0.910)  0.018 (0.387)  -0.026 (0.413) 
Zscore    0.001 (0.600)  0.002** (0.029)  0.001 (0.503) 
%Medicare    0.027 (0.282)  -0.018 (0.193)  0.022 (0.319) 
CMI    0.023 (0.224)  0.036*** (0.001)  0.039** (0.021) 
Log Discharges    -0.001 (0.916)  0.013*** (<0.001)  -0.009** (0.032) 
Log Boardsize    -0.004 (0.585)  -0.005 (0.235)  -0.001 (0.922) 
Church Dummy    0.012* (0.096)  0.006 (0.127)  0.014** (0.025) 
System Dummy    0.001 (0.895)  0.001 (0.969)  0.003 (0.532) 
Rural Dummy    -0.013 (0.255)  0.005 (0.408)  0.001 (0.929) 
Hospital-Market-Level Control Variables 
HHI    -0.023 (0.147)  0.003 (0.719)  0.001 (0.921) 
Log Median Household 
Income    -0.011 (0.509)  -0.002 (0.804)  0.004 (0.777) 
Constant    0.093 (0.616)  -0.059 (0.573)  0.048 (0.770) 
        
Year Dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustered by    Hospital  Hospital  Hospital 
Observations   522  522  522 
R-squared     0.697  0.674  0.444 
Notes to Table 8: 
 
a p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed), year dummies included but not reported, 
standard errors clustered by hospital, variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. See Table 3 for variable 
definitions. 
 
 